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THE EMPATHETIC, WHITE MALE: AN
AGGRIEVED PERSON UNDER TITLE VII?
INTRODUCTION
Should courts grant standing to sue for individuals outside the
class which the law protects?' Should those under forty be entitled to
raise claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act?2
Should whites be able to bring discrimination claims when the
defendant targets his discrimination against Black and Spanish-
surnamed individuals? 3  Are white males aggrieved when
discrimination targets Black persons and females?4 More importantly,
should Title VII afford remedy to individuals indirectly harmed by
the discriminatory acts of the employer or supervisor? In some
contexts, the courts have addressed such issues. However, in the case
of Title VII, much remains unresolved for matters of indirect
discrimination issues.
1. For a definition and discussion of standing principals, see infra, notes 29-44 and
accompanying text.
2. Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act [hereinafter ADEA], section 623,
Congress makes it unlawful:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's age; [or] (2) to limit, segregate,
or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's age ....
29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1994). Section 631 further states that "[tlhe prohibitions in this chapter
shall be limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of age." 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1994).
3. See, e.g., Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466, 467 (9th Cir. 1976). See also
discussion, infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
4. See. e.g., Childress v. City of Richmond, 134 F.3d 1205, 1208 (4th Cir. 1998). See
also infra notes 94-110 and accompanying text.
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While courts trumpet Title VII as legislation that enables them to
eradicate discrimination, they disagree about how broadly to grant
standing to those who are not direct targets of discrimination but are
exposed to and offended by such harassment directed toward their
coworkers.5 Courts have broadened their interpretation of "persons
aggrieved," but few have gone so far as to assert that those who are
not targeted by discrimination and who may even be the beneficiaries
of such harassment have standing. This note will refer to this group
as the "empathetic white males" the class of persons that the courts
have struggled with in recent Title VII jurisprudence. 6
Courts affording standing to those outside the protected
victimized class rationalize that granting standing broadly supports
Title VII's purpose.7 This note suggests that such permissive standing
is contrary to Title VII's process and structure, which actually
requires those outside the protected victimized class to oppose
personally such practices before obtaining standing.8
Part I of this note explores the background of standing in the Title
VII context. It considers the theories courts have used to decide
whether those indirectly affected by prohibited activity should have
standing to sue as if they were the targets of that activity. Part II of
this note analyzes the circuit split. Through this analysis, it attempts
to decipher the incongruencies of the civil rights statutes in an
attempt to evaluate clearly the congressional intent regarding
standing for indirect victims of harassment in the workplace under
Title VII. Finally, Part III attempts to resolve the dual problem of
eradicating discrimination while remaining faithful to the goals of
Title VII by proposing a separate system of punitive fines against the
5. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq (1994). Whether or not standing is granted is
central to this issue. Without standing, the court will not hear the merits of the empathetic white
male's case. See generally N. Morrison Torrey, Indirect Discrimination Under Title VII:
Expanding Male Standing to Sue for Injuries Received as a Result of Employer Discrimination
Against Females, 64 WASH. L. REV. 365, 369-72 (1989) (discussing general standing
principles).
6. See Torrey, supra note 5, for a comprehensive discussion of this issue. Torrey presents
a position contrary to this note's contention that standing should be restricted, not broadened.
Id.
7. See infra notes 63-80 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 19-23; and infra
notes 10-11 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Hackett v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442, 446-47
(3d Cir.1971) (interpreting Title VII to grant standing broadly).
8. See infra notes 128-41 and accompanying text.
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employer to compensate society for the damage caused by its
discriminatory conduct.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Title VII
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
expressly to eradicate discrimination in "any aspect of the
employment relation including hiring, promotion, transfer, or firing"9
on the basis of "race, color, sex, religion or national origin."' 0
Proponents of Title VII theorized that the elimination of
discriminatory employment practices would result in the
consideration of people based on their individual merit, thereby
producing the additional benefit of improved efficiency in the
marketplace." However, Title VII affords standing only to "persons
aggrieved."' 2 Historically, courts have struggled to define "persons
aggrieved" and eventually resorted to Title VIII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968, Title VI's housing discrimination counterpart, for its
definition. 13
9. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS 160-61 (1992).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994). Interestingly, "sex" was a last minute addition to
the final version of Title VII. See Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS.
& COM. L. REV. 441-42 (1966) (noting that the Congressional Record is an inadequate source
of legislative intent because Congress was rushed to pass Title VII and sacrificed meaningful
discussion in the Congressional Record to meet their deadline). According to Vaas,
Mr. Smith, long-time Chairman of the House Committee on Rules-and not a civil
rights enthusiast-offered his amendment in a spirit of satire and ironic cajolery...
The amendment was agreed to 168 to 133 .... It was proposed and quickly adopted
after hasty debate in the House under the "five minute" rule .... The House debate
thereon covers no more than nine pages of the Congressional Record.
Id at 441-42. Congress provided little guidance to courts applying Title VII. See id. at 431,
457-58.
11. Vaas, supra note 10, at 444-45 (citing Senator Humphrey's remarks on Title VII, 1 10
Cong. Rec. 6528 (1964)). Congress considered primarily racial discrimination as the focus of
Title VII. See H. Rep. No. 88-914, at 28 (1963) (stating that the "failure of our society to extend
job opportunities to the Negro is an economic waste").
12. Section 706(0(1) of Title VII provides that: "a civil action may be brought against the
respondent named in the charge (A) by the person claiming to be aggrieved or (B) if such
charge was filed by a member of the Commission, by any person whom the charge alleges was
aggrieved by the alleged unlawful employment practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq (1994). For additional discussion of defining "persons
1999]
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B. Title VIII
Whether courts adopt Title VIII's definition of "persons
aggrieved 14 may determine whether the Court grants standing to the
empathetic white male under Title VII.15 Courts struggle to decide
whether to extend the language and subsequent interpretation of Title
VIII's definition of "persons aggrieved" to Title VII. 6 Such an
extension is desirable to courts that wish to apply Title VII broadly
because Title VIII provides a specific definition of "persons
aggrieved," while Title VII does not.'7 Title VIII further creates a
private right of action for persons aggrieved by a violation of Title
VIII, thereby allowing Congress to expand standing to those who
otherwise would be barred under prudential standing rules.'8
Those advocating the extension of Title VIII's interpretation of
"persons aggrieved" to Title VII rely on several factors including the
similarities between the language, 19 design, and purposes20 of both
aggrieved" under Title VII, see SULLIVAN Er AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 11.8.3,
498-501 (1988).
14. See infra note 17.
15. Because Title VIII's definition and interpretation of the phrase "persons aggrieved" is
broader than Title VII's corresponding definition, the empathetic white male qualifies under the
Title VIII definition. See EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 1980)
(stating that Trafficante, a Title VIII case, will not permit a bar to every charge of
discrimination against a group of which the plaintiffis not a member); Waters v. Heublein, Inc.,
547 F.2d 466, 469-70 (9th Cir. 1976) (extending Title VIII definition of "persons aggrieved" to
Title VII case and granting standing to white woman who complained of discrimination against
Black persons and Hispanics). Butsee Childress v. City of Richmond, 134 F.3d 1205, 1209 (4th
Cir. 1998) (J. Luttig, concurring) (refusing to apply Title VIII interpretation to Title VII cases
and denying standing to empathetic white males); Patee v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 803
F.2d 476, 478-79 (9th Cir. 1986) (denying empathetic white male standing because plaintiffs
failed to assert Trafficante-type damages, which would have allowed extension of the Title VIII
interpretation).
16. See EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439,451-52 (6th Cir. 1977) (providing a thorough
explanation of dissention in the courts over the empathetic white male's inclusion in the
"persons aggrieved definition).
17. Section 3602(i) defines "aggrieved person" as "any person who (1) claims to have
been injured by a discriminatory housing practice; or (2) believes that such person will be
injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur." 42 U.S.C. § 3602(1) (1994).
18. Hemandez v. Ruiz, 812 F. Supp. 734, 737 (S.D. Tex. 1993). See 42 U.S.C.
§ 3613(a)(1)(A) (1994).
19. See infra note 75 and accompanying text. Courts have compared section 706(b) of
Title VII, which provides an action "[w]henever a charge if filed by or on behalf of a person
claiming to be aggrieved.. ." to section 801(a) of Title VIII, which allows for "an aggrieved
person" to commence action. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) & 3610(a).
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Title VII and Title VIII.21 Furthermore, at least one court holds that
because Title VIII jurisprudence relies upon Title VII interpretations
to form Title VIII's definition of "persons aggrieved, 22 such a
definition should be transposed to Title VII.
23
However, a strong dissenting group refers to the incongruent
legislative history of Title VII and Title VIII to deny application of
Title VIII's definition to Title VII. 24 During Congressional hearings
on Title VIII, members of Congress specifically recited Congress'
intent that Title VIII benefit those indirectly affected by
discriminatory conduct.25 More plainly, the Fourth Circuit notes that
"persons aggrieved" is a term of art incorporating a presumption that
the term carries its understood definition unless otherwise specified.26
While Title VIII provided a specific definition to exclude such a
presumption, Title VI's absence of a specific definition requires
courts to read "persons aggrieved" as Congress normally understood
the phrase.27 Those opposing application of Title VIII jurisprudence
20. See EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 453 (6th Cir. 1977) (noting that both Titles
VII and VIII seek to "outlaw[] discrimination based on race, religion, national origin, and sex
by providing equal employment and fair housing opportunities").
21. See EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing EEOC v.
Bailey Co., 563 F.2d at 450-54, and Waters v. Heublein, 547 F.2d 466,469-70 (9th Cir. 1976)).
22. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972).
23. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d at 453 (noting that the Supreme Court in Trafficante, cited with
approval Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1971)). Thus, the Bailey court
concluded that "the Supreme Court does not conceive Titles VII and VIII to be different." 563
at 453.
24. See Childress v. City of Richmond, 134 F.3d 1205, 1210 n.3 (4th Cir. 1998) (Luttig,
J., concurring).
25. See Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 210 (stating that "[w]hile members of minority groups
were damaged the most from discrimination in housing practices, the proponents of the
legislation emphasized that those who were not the direct objects of discrimination had an
interest in ensuring fair housing, as they too suffered").
The Supreme Court supported this proposition citing Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on sections
1358, 2114 and 2280, during the first session of the ninetieth Congress.
26. Childress, 134 F.3d at 1208 (Luttig, J., concurring). Specifically, general statutory
interpretation requires the court to apply the term of art definition unless the term is defined
differently by Congress in the statute. Id. at 1208-09.
27. Justice Luttig quoted, OWCP v. Newport News where the Supreme Court stated that,
"[t]he phrase 'person adversely affected or aggrieved' is a term of art used in many statutes to
designate those who have standing to challenge or appeal an agency decision, within the agency
or before the courts .... Id. at 1208 (quoting OWCP v. Newport News, 514 U.S. 122, 125
(1995)) (citations omitted in original).
1999]
Washington University Open Scholarship
140 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 55:135
note further that Congress enacted Title VIII with a specific
definition of "aggrieved person" four years after it enacted Title VII
without a specific definition of the very same term.2 8
C. General Constitutional Standing Principles
29
If courts apply the "term of art" definition of "persons aggrieved"
rather than the definition provided by Title VIII, the plaintiff must
fulfill both constitutional and prudential requirements of standing.
3 0
In the Title VII context, the court makes a two-pronged inquiry to
determine whether an individual has standing to pursue his claim in
federal court. First, the plaintiff must meet the case or controversy
requirement of Article III of the Constitution.31 The individual must
point to an "injury in fact" that is likely redressable by a favorable
ruling by the court.32 The plaintiff further must assert a concrete or
tangible harm that is fairly traceable to the unlawful conduct.
33
28. 134 F.3d at 1210. Generally, when Congress applies a definition excluded from the
statute in question, the courts must infer that Congress specifically intended to exclude such a
definition for that statute. Id.
29. For a comprehensive analysis of general standing principals, see Torrey, supra note 5,
at 373-74. See also HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW § 13.10 at 509-15 (1997).
30. Infranote4l.
31. United States Constitution Article III Section 2 reads:
The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between
two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of another State;-between
Citizens of different states ....
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The Article I requirements are immutable. See generally, Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
32. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970). See also
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38-39 (1976); Trafficante, 409 U.S. at
211 (alleging a particular injury is necessary to prevent court from addressing only an abstract
question).
33. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485 (1982) (reasoning that "[plaintiffs] fail to identify any personal
injury suffered by them as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other than the
psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one
disagrees"); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n.19 (1983) (defining the "fairly traceable"
requirement of the constitutional standing inquiry through an examination of the "causal
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The Court also places default prudential limitations on standing.34
Under these prudential limitations, standing is not afforded generally
to vindicate the rights of third parties.35 Further, the plaintiff lacks
standing if he merely asserts a "generalized grievance., 36 Moreover,
the prudential limitations require that the plaintiff fall within the
zone of interests" protected by the legislation.37 At a minimum, the
plaintiff must satisfy the court that his interest is arguably within the
zone of interests protected by the statutory framework supporting his
claim. 38 Title VII affords standing to any "person claiming to be
aggrieved" by an activity prohibited by Title VII.39 Additional Title
VII provisions afford redress to individuals who are not directly
attacked by discriminatory activity but are the victims of retaliation
for their opposition to such activity.
40
Congress can override the default prudential standing
requirements and authorize anyone who satisfies Constitutional
standing requirements to bring a claim.4' Absent such an exception,
the plaintiff must fulfill both the Constitutional and prudential
standing requirements.42 In the case of the empathetic white male,
some courts rely on Title VIII's broad definition of "persons
aggrieved" to loosen the prudential limitations, and apply a more
permissive approach to Title VII.43 This reading has resulted in more
empathetic white males surviving initial standing requirements,
connection between the assertedly unlawful conduct and the alleged injury").
34. For detailed discussion of prudential limitations, see LEWIS, supra note 29, at 512.
35. SeeTilestonv. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
36. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216-27 (1974). See
also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968).
37. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. at 751.
38. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. at 153. In
creating the zone of interests test, the Supreme Court rejected the "legal interest" test because it
required a finding on the merits of the case rather than a pure standing decision, therefore, it
enlarged the class of plaintiffs eligible to sue. Id. at 154-56.
39. Supra note 12.
40. Infra note 114 and accompanying text.
41. Childress v. City of Richmond, 134 F.3d 1205, 1208 (4th Cir. 1998) (Luttig, J.,
concurring).
42. Id Both requirements must be fulfilled under the term of art definition because
Congress did not provide a provision overriding the prudential limitations. Id.
43. Infra notes 63-80 and accompanying text. See generally, Chandler v. Fast Lane, Inc.,
868 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (permitting white plaintiff to challenge discriminatory
hiring and promotion practices directed only against African-American employees).
1999]
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allowing courts to hear the merits of their cases.
D. Hostile Environment
Empathetic white male plaintiffs raise Title VII actions
exclusively under the hostile environment theory of harassment or
retaliation.44 No determinative rationale exists for the empathetic
white male bringing exclusively hostile environment claims.
However, this result may be explained by the hostile environment
claim's status as the only action in the employment context that
specifically refers to the environment created by discrimination. As a
result, it opens doors to those working in such an environment, who
are not targeted. 45
Although Title VII's statutory language does not expressly
prohibit harassment, courts have broadened Title VII's scope by
recognizing harassment as a prohibited form of discrimination.46 No
court considered hostile environment47 claims actionable under Title
V1148 until the 1981 case of Bundy v. Jackson.49 Prior to this decision
44. Harassment in violation of Title VII occurs in two forms: quid pro quo and hostile
environment. Under quid pro quo, "sexual harassment occurs whenever an individual explicitly
or implicitly conditions a job, a job benefit, or the absence of a job detriment, upon an
employee's acceptance of sexual conduct." Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 1994).
See infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text. See also Torrey, supra note 5, at 376-82 (noting
that there are two ways in which the empathetic white male can bring an action for indirect
discrimination).
45. Consequently, empathetic white males theorize that exposure to such environment is
sufficient when accompanying by harm to such exposure. See infra note 63 and accompanying
text.
46. For requirements under hostile environment claims, see infra notes 51-57 and
accompanying text. See generally Katherine H. Flynn, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment: Sex,
Gender and the Definition of Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1099
(1997). See also MACKINNON, infra note 50, at 57-99.
47. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1981). The E.E.O.C. regulations define sexual harassment as
"[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct
of a sexual nature . . . when . . . such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or
offensive working environment." Id.
48. See, e.g., Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J.
1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding sexual harassment and sexual assault are
not actionable as discrimination under Title VII); Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233,
235-36 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, 390 F.
Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975).
49. 641 F.2d 934, 943-45 (D.C. App. 1981). The Supreme Court affirmed the principal of
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plaintiffs relied on traditional tort theories to argue harassment. 0
In hostile environment claims,5' the plaintiff must prove the
following elements: 1) plaintiff belongs to a protected class;5 2 2) the
conduct in question was unwelcome;53 3) the harassment was based
on a prohibited classification-sex, race, or national origin;54 4) the
harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive
hostile environment claims in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (stating
that "a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on
sex has created a hostile or abusive working environment.").
The Supreme Court noted that sexual harassment is an equally "arbitrary barrier" to
workplace equality. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (1 1th Cir.
1982)). Furthermore, the Court held that because Title VII covered all terms and conditions of
employment, the language of Title VII sufficiently reached harassment. Meritor, 477 U.S. at
64-65. See also, EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 360.
Initially, hostile environment claims were available only to victims of sexual harassment,
but the courts have subsequently allowed the harassment theory to apply to all protected classes.
See. e.g., Davis v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 858 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 1988) (allowing racial
harassment claims). However, the requirements for racial harassment are not completely
congruent. According to Davis, "all that the victim of racial harassment need show is that the
alleged conduct constituted an unreasonably abusive or offensive work-related environment or
adversely affected the reasonable employee's ability to do his or her job." Id. at 349.
50. EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 352-57. Epstein noted that under traditional tort theories,
harassment could be tried under assault and battery, insult, offensive battery, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, or invasion of privacy, depending on the severity of the
harassment. Id. at 352-53. See CATHERINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 57-99(1979) (explaining why harassment
constitutes discrimination in the workplace). But cf Ellen Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex
Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL. REv. 333 (1990).
51. The EEOC guidelines on discrimination define hostile environment harassment as
conduct that "has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.1 l(a)(3) (1998).
52. Id.
53. Unwelcome conduct includes "sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature." C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a) (1998). Such conduct also
includes "non-sexual harassing acts" directed though physical force or verbal attacks because of
a prohibited classification. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68. But see Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div.
Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007, 1008 (7th Cir. 1994) (calling "welcome sexual harassment"
an "oxymoron").
The requirement that the conduct be unwelcome in itself is problematic for the empathetic
white male, even if the court affords him standing. "Welcomeness" itself presumes targeting, to
which the empathetic white male is not subject by definition as a victim of "indirect
discrimination."
54. Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that the plaintiff
must show "but for the fact of her sex [or race] the plaintiff would not have been the object of
harassment").
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working environment; 55 and 5) there is some basis for imputing
liability to the employer.56 Furthermore, the harassing conduct must
affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment.
5 7
E. Application of Standing Principles Under Title VII Hostile
Environment Claims5
While the federal courts generally afford standing to people of all
classifications under Title VII, they are split on whether to grant
standing to white males where the only targets of the unlawful
activity are minorities and females.59 Generally, empathetic white
males who assert a denial of tangible benefits, such as pay6° or denial
of a promotion,61 have more success on the standing issue than those
55. In Harris v. Forklift Systems, the Supreme Court articulated a totality of the
circumstances approach to determine the existence of a hostile environment:
[W]hether an environment is "hostile" or "abusive" can be determined only by looking
at all the circumstances. These may include the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance.
510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). The Harris test is echoed by the E.E.O.C.'s sexual harassment
guidelines. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (b).
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Harris v. Forklift Systems, some circuit courts
required plaintiffs alleging hostile environment to establish that such harassment seriously
impaired their psychological well being. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904
(11 th Cir.1982). See also Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 213-14 (7th Cir. 1986)
(finding that the "demeaning conduct and sexual stereotyping [did not] cause such anxiety and
debilitation to the plaintiff that working conditions were 'poisoned' within the meaning of Title
VII").
56. See Collins v. Baptist Memorial Geriatric Ctr., 937 F.2d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1991);
Swentek v. USAir, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d
at 905.
The appropriate standard for employer liability in hostile environment cases is widely
disputed. For a comprehensive presentation of recent case law, see Debra L. Raskin, Sexual
Harassment in Employment, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS, at 1288-97 (1997).
57. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972)).
58. See generally Torrey, supra note 5, for another perspective of who should be afforded
standing under Title VII.
59. Torrey, supra note 5, at 365.
60. Peters v. City of Shreveport, 818 F.2d 1148, 1165-66 (5th Cir. 1987); Patee v. Pacific
Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 803 F.2d 476,478 (9th Cir. 1986).
61. See, e.g., Bastian v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., No. 85 C. 8041 (N.D. I1. Dec. 5, 1985)
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asserting harm to vital relationships and working conditions. 62
1. Broad Approach To Standing
Many courts hold that any plaintiff who suffers an injury due to an
employer's unlawful business practice is sufficiently aggrieved to
have standing to file a civil action.63 These courts adopt the belief that
standing for civil rights violations should be as broad as possible.64
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
62. See Childress v. City of Richmond, 134 F.3d 1205 (4th Cir. 1998). Cf However,
courts relying solely on Title VIII require some assertion that loss of associational benefits
occurred due to the harassment of the other classes of persons. See infra note 84 and
accompanying text.
63. Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1244-45 (3d Cir.
1978) (affording male standing to sue following discharge because "his actions and advocacy
stood in the path of a plan to deprive women of their equal opportunity rights"); EEOC v.
Bailey, 563 F.2d 439, 452 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding that EEOC could bring suit based on white
female's charge of discrimination against blacks); Waters v. Hueblein, 547 F.3d 466, 469-70
(9th Cir. 1976) (affording standing to white female to redress discrimination against blacks and
Spanish-surnamed employees); Hackett v. McGuire Bros. Co., 445 F.2d 442, 446 (3d Cir.
1971) (granting standing to pensioner for an unlawful employment practices under Title VII
even though he was no longer an employee); Donnelly v. Rhode Island Bd. of Govemors for
Higher Educ., 929 F. Supp. 583, 590 (D.R.I. 1996) (granting standing to various professionals
who brought suit against university system for discriminatory wage structure); Allen v.
American Home Foods, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1553, 1557-58 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (affording standing
to workers under the age of forty to sue under the ADEA); Bartleson v. Dean Witter Co., 86
F.R.D. 657, 665 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (affording standing to white female to sue for discrimination
against blacks).
Several lower courts follow the general rationale to permit standing to non-attacked
individuals. See Torrey, supra note 6, at 400 (citing Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc.,
103 F.R.D. 562, 572 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Smithberg v. Merico, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 80, 82-83
(C.D. Cal. 1983); Richardson v. Restaurant Mktg. Ass'n, 527 F. Supp. 690, 694-95 (N.D. Cal.
1981); Bartelson v. Dean Witter & Co., 86 F.R.D. 657, 665 (E.D. Pa. 1980); NOW v. Sperry
Rand Corp., 457 F. Supp. 1338, 1344-47 (D. Conn. 1978); EEOC v. McLemore Food Stores,
Inc., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1356, 1357 (W.D. Tenn. 1977)); Cf Badillo v. Central
Steel & Wire Co., 495 F. Supp. 299,305 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
64. See Huffv. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710, 714 (5th Cir. 1973); Rosen v. Public Serv.
Elec. and Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90, 94 (3d Cir. 1973).
See also Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc. 445 F.2d 442, 446-47 (3d Cir. 1971). In Hackett,
the court discussed its approach to the standing doctrine in Title VII litigation, stating:
The national public policy reflected... in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964...
may not be frustrated by the development of overly technical judicial doctrines of
standing or election of remedies. If the plaintiff is sufficiently aggrieved so that he
claims enough injury in fact to present a genuine case or controversy in this Article III
sense, then he should have standing to sue in his own right and as a class
representative.
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Additionally, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") consistently confers standing to any person "aggrieved"
under Title VII, including individuals who are not members of the
class targeted by unlawful employment practices.
65
Those courts that do grant broad standing believe that males and
Caucasians have a protectable interest in harmonious relationships
with members of another gender or race.66 This camp of opinion
justifies its holding with Title VIII jurisprudence. 67 The most notable
case in this line of Title VIII precedent is the Supreme Court's
decision in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.68 In
Trafficante, the Court held that white tenants of an apartment
complex had standing to sue under Title VIII for their landlord's
discriminatory housing practices against minorities.61 The Court
recognized the white tenants' loss of the social benefit of living in an
integrated community.70 Such advantages included loss of business
and professional advantages that would have accrued from living
with members of minority groups.71 Furthermore, the Court
recognized the stigmatization of the plaintiffs as residents of a white
ghetto as a tangible harm resulting from the landlord's
Id. at 446-47.
A majority of the circuits adopts a broad view of standing in Title VII litigation. See
generally Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 517 (6th Cir. 1976) (citing Hadnott v.
Laird, 463 F.2d 304,311 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Graniteville Co. v. EEOC, 438 F.2d 32, 36 (4th
Cir. 1971); Carr v. Conoco Plastics, Inc. 423 F.2d 57, 65 (5th Cir. 1970)).
65. EEOC Decision No. 70-09, 1973 EEOC Decision (CCH) 6026, at 4049 (July 8,
1969) . The EEOC has stated that it believed it clear then an employee's legitimate interest in
the terms and conditions of his employment comprehends his right to work in an atmosphere
free from unlawful employment practices and their consequences. Under the original provisions
of Title VII, the EEOC played only the roles of investigation and conciliation. See SULLIVAN Er
AL., supra note 13, § 12.1 at 53940. However, under the 1972 amendments to Title VII,
Congress substantially altered the structure of the EEOC, granting the EEOC the power to bring
suits themselves to challenge discrimination. Id. at 540.
66. Childress v. City of Richmond, 120 F.3d 476, 481 (4th Cir. 1997); EEOC v.
Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477,482 (5th Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439,452
(6th Cir. 1977). The Bailey court stated that "[flor several reasons, Trafficante requires us to
hold that the definition of 'a person claiming to be aggrieved' under Title VII includes a white
person.., who may have suffered from the loss of benefits from the lack of association with
racial minorities at work." 563 F.2d at 452.
67. For a detailed discussion of Title VIII, see supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
68. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
69. Id. at 208.
70. Id. at 209-10.
71. Id. at 208.
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discrimination.72 The harm resulting from discriminating against
Black persons in the apartment community qualified the white
plaintiffs as "persons aggrieved, 73 under the Civil Rights Act of 1968
because they were injured by a discriminatory housing practice. 74
Courts granting standing to the empathetic white male find that
Trafficante compels them to read the language of Title VII as broadly
as that of Title VIII. 75 This is not only because both Title VII and
Title VIII are part of the Civil Rights Acts, but also because both
incorporate the language "persons aggrieved. 76 Furthermore, courts
adopting this broad approach view the language of Title VII and Title
72. 409 U.S. at 208.
73. Id. at 209-10. The Supreme Court held that the definition of "person aggrieved"
contained in section 8 10(a) of Title VIII "showed 'a congressional intention to define standing
as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution."' Id. at 209 (quoting Hackett v.
McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1971)).
74. 409 U.S. at 212.
75. See EEOC v. Bailey Co., Inc., 563 F.2d at 452 (stating that "Trafficante requires to
hold that the definition of 'a person claiming to be aggrieved' under Title VII includes a white
person. . who may have suffered from the loss of benefits from the lack of association with
racial minorities at work"). See also Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 846, 848-50 (7th Cir. 1982);
Winston v. Lear Siegler, 558 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1977); Waters v. Heublein, 547 F.2d 466,469-
70 (9th Cir.1976).
76. The definition of the prohibited conduct in Title VII differs slightly from that in Title
VIII. Title VII makes it illegal to discriminate against any individual "because of such
individual's race ... [or] sex ..." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1). Title VIII, the housing statute,
makes it unlawful "[t]o refuse to sell or rent.., to any person because of race ... [or] sex..."
or f[tlo discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental
of a dwelling ... because of race ... [or] sex." 42 U.S.C. 3601(a)(2). See Childress v. City of
Richmond, 120 F.3d 476, 481 n.6 (4th Cir. 1997), rev'd, 134 F.3d 1205, 1209 ("Because the
only reasonable reading of [Title VIII] is a prohibition against discrimination 'against any
person because of that person's race or sex,' we attach no significance to this difference in
wording")
See also Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae at 15-
16 [hereinafter EEOC Br.]; Childress v. City of Richmond, Va., 120 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1997)
(No. 96-1585). The EEOC cites five reasons why Trafficante compels adoption in the Title VU
context: I) the aggrieved person language in Title VII and Title VIII are "strikingly similar,"
EEOC Br at 15-16 (citing EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 452 (6th Cir. 1977)); 2) the
design of Title VII and Title VIII are similar, and place particular importance in the
empowering individuals to compel the end of discrimination, id. at 15-16, (citing Bailey Co.,
563 F.2d at 453); 3) Trafficante cited Title VII cases with approval, id. (citing Hackett v.
McGuire Bros. Co., 445 F.2d 442 (3rd Cir. 1971) (holding that Congress meant to define
standing under Title VII as broadly as Article III would permit)); 4)the general purpose of
outlawing discrimination is the same and the face that one applies to employment and the other
to housing does not warrant a difference in standing requirements, id.; and 5) the agencies
empowered in both Title VII and Title VIII have permitted whites to challenge discrimination
against blacks. Id
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VIII as sufficiently similar to afford the same interpretation to each."
Therefore, after Trafficante's textual interpretation, the lower courts
extended the definition of "persons aggrieved" in Title VII cases to
include plaintiffs asserting harm from indirect discrimination. 8
The empathetic individual need not always be male in those
jurisdictions where courts loosely grant standing. In Waters v.
Heublein, Inc., the Ninth Circuit granted standing to a white female
who sued her employer for discrimination against women, as well as
Black and Spanish-surnamed individuals. 79  Finding Title VII
employment actions similar to Title VIII housing actions, the court
rationalized its grant of standing under the premise that interpersonal
contacts with people of other races is as important in the workplace
as it is in the home.
80
2. Middle Approach to Granting Title VII Standing
Under Title VII, most courts have broadened their interpretation
of the statute only moderately. These courts generally hold that if a
plaintiff establishes a tangible harm, then he or she is a person
aggrieved under Title VII, regardless of whether he or she was the
actual target of the harassment.
The Fifth Circuit adopted this moderate approach in EEOC v.
Mississippi College, holding that a person can make a discrimination
charge based on actions taken against a group of which he is not a
77. See supra notes 14-28 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 19 and accompanying text
79. 547 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1976). Plaintiff, like the plaintiff in EEOC v. Mississippi
College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), originally filed a complaint to the EEOC solely for sex
discrimination and later added claims in an amended complaint. Waters, 547 F.2d at 467-68.
80. Id. at 469. Subsequent decisions widely quote the Ninth Circuit's holding that:
[1Interpersonal contacts-between members of the same or different races-are no less
a part of the work environment than of the home environment. Indeed, in modem
America, a person is as likely, and often more likely to know his fellow workers than
the tenants next door or down the hall. The possibilities of advantageous personal,
professional or business contacts are certainly great at work as at home. The benefits
of interracial harmony are as great in either local. The distinction between laws aimed
at desegregation and laws aimed at equal opportunity are illusory. These goals are
opposite sides of the same coin.
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member."1 In Mississippi College, the Fifth Circuit found the
plaintiff, a white female, to be a "person aggrieved" because she
claimed that the defendant infected her work environment with racial
discrimination. 2 The Court did not decide the sufficiency of her
claim.83 It did state, however, that a plaintiff must allege a specific
injury relating to the deprivation of the benefits of a working
environment free from discrimination.
84
However, even if a plaintiff does allege a specific injury, most
courts departing from the broad grant of standing also require the
plaintiff to allege that his employer deprived him of such benefits
because of his gender or race. In Patee v. Pacific Northwest Bell
Telephone Co., a male employee brought a sex discrimination action
against his employer, alleging that because he worked in a
predominantly female group he received less pay than those in a
predominantly male group performing similar functions. In Patee,
the Ninth Circuit refused to apply Trafficante, limiting Trafficante's
application to cases where the plaintiff asserts a harmful impact
because of the denial of association with members of other groups.
86
81. 626 F.2d 477, 483 (5th Cir. 1980). However, the Court limited its holding stating,
-Our decision today does not allow [plaintiff] to assert the rights of others. We hold no more
than that, provided she meets the standing requirements imposed by Article III, [plaintiff] may
charge a violation of her own personal right to work in an environment unaffected by racial
discrimination." Id. The Court further limited its decision exclusively to racial discrimination.
Id..
82. For discussion of the definition of "persons aggrieved," see supra note 12 and
accompanying text. 626 F.2d at 481.Mississippi College is a religious educational institution
that had a written policy affording hiring preference to Baptists except where necessary to
maintain academic standards. Id. In her amended complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the
College where she worked discriminated against blacks in the recruitment and hiring of faculty.
Id
However, originally, plaintiff filed a complaint based on sex discrimination in hiring
because the college denied her a position for which she believed she was qualified. Id. at 480.
Pursuant to her complaint, the EEOC issued a "Subpoena Ad Testificandum/Duces Tecum."
After which, plaintiff amended her complaint to allege racial discrimination. Id. at 480-81.
83. 626 F.2d at 477. The Fifth Circuit vacated the Southern District of Mississippi's
decision and remanded the case to the district court for factual findings under Title VII
principals. Id. at 489.
84. Id. at 483. See also Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 846, 849 (7th Cir. 1982) (recognizing
the district court's denial of a cause of action similar to the approach taken in EEOC v.
Mississippi College, "because [plaintiff] had failed to allege that the discrimination deprived her
of the benefits of an integrated working environment").
85. 803 F.2d 476,479 (9th Cir. 1986).
86. Id. at 478-79.
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The court required, in the alternative that the males assert
discrimination against them "because they were men."
87
3. Narrow Approach To Granting Title VII Standing
Before courts extended the analysis in Trafficante to Title VII, the
presumption underlying Title VII harassment actions was that only
those who were targets of such harassment had an actionable claim.
88
The pre-Trafficante premise was that only those who were the actual
focus of the harassment had suffered a tangible harm, and that
Congress did not intend Title VII to be so broad as to provide
associational rights.89 Today, a minority of courts adheres to this
interpretation and requires the plaintiff to be a direct, targeted victim
of the illegal activity or to be a member of the identified protected
class. 9°
One principal justification under this strict approach lies in same-
sex harassment jurisprudence, under which some courts deny sexual
harassment standing to a heterosexual male harassed by another
heterosexual male.9' These courts reason that because the plaintiff
87. Id. The court said that its prior precedent in Spaulding v. University of Washington,
740 F.2d 686, 709 (9th Cir. 1984), required it "to conclude that the male workers cannot assert
the right of their female co-workers to be free from discrimination based on their [the female's]
sex." 803 F.2d at 478.
88. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Linskey v. Heidelberg Eastern,
Inc., 470 F. Supp. 1181, 1187 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) ("Since plaintiff is a male, he lacks standing
under Title VII to present that claim").
89. See discussion of Rodkey v. Trans World Airlines, 1997 WL 823568 (W.D. Mo. Oct.
7, 1997), infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. An exception is made for retaliation claims,
which many view as associational by definition. See infra notes 113-20 and accompanying text.
90. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (denying standing to parents of black
children who attended public schools in districts undergoing desegregation because the alleged
injury was not fairly traceable to the government's alleged unlawful conduct); Robinson v. PPG
Indus., 23 F.3d 1159 (7th Cir. 1994) (requiring plaintiff to fall within the protected age class of
persons between the ages of 40 and 70 to have standing under ADEA); Patee v. Pacific
Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 803 F.2d 476,479 (1986) (denying standing to male employees
of a predominantly female department to sue because of sex-based wage discrimination against
women); AFL-CIO v. Nassau County, 664 F. Supp. 64 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (denying standing to
"male county civil service employees who alleged they were underpaid because they worked at
'traditionally female jobs.' because "males did not claim they were discriminated against
because they were men").
91. McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. Of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996)
(holding that harassment that is sexual in nature, but committed by heterosexual males against
heterosexual males is not harassment because of sex). However, same-sex harassment
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could not bring the suit on direct discrimination theory, there should
be no standing for indirect discrimination.
92
Similar to courts adopting the moderate or middle ground
approach, courts that deny standing strictly rely on the theory that
"the male [or white] workers do not claim that they have been
discriminated against because they are men [or white]. 93 In Rodkey
v. Trans World Airlines, a male plaintiff sued his employer for a
hostile environment targeting and harassing his wife.94 The Western
District of Missouri granted Trans World Airlines summary judgment
on the grounds that hostile environment claims must be gender-
based. 95 While the disparaging remarks and pornographic material
were personally offensive, the plaintiff failed to show that he was the
jurisprudence is quickly evolving and determination on this theory may be altered once the
Supreme Court issues its opinion in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 83 F.3d 118 (5th
Cir. 1996) (holding that Title VII does not allow a claim for same-sex sexual harassment).
92. Many courts have denied standing because the male or Caucasian has failed to assert a
direct injury for the discrimination against others. See Torrey, supra note 5, at 381 n.85 (citing
Ruffin v. County of Los Angeles, 607 F.2d 1276, 1281 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
951 (1980) (prohibiting male plaintiffs from bootstrapping claims based upon alleged past
discrimination against women in a distinguishable position); Linskey v. Heidelberg Eastern,
Inc., 470 F. Supp. 1180, 1187 (S.D. 1981) (holding a male could not present claim of
discrimination against women); EEOC v. Quick Shop Mkts., 396 F. Supp. 133 (E.D. Mo.
1975), afltd, 526 F.2d 802 (8th Cir. 1975) (denying standing to parties attempting to enforce
subpoenas in race discrimination investigation); EEOC v. National Mine Serv. Co., 8 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1233, 1234 (E.D. Ky. 1974) (prohibiting white union president from
representing a class action based on discrimination against Black persons); Thomas v. Ford
Motor Co., 396 F. Supp. 52, 62 (E.D. Mich. 1973), aftd, 516 F.2d 902 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 988 (1975) (holding white plaintiff was not qualified to represent a class asserting
discrimination against Black persons); Martin v. Safeway Trails, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 683, 684
(D.D.C. 1973) (finding that black male had no standing to represent female or national origin
class in sex discrimination suit)). Torrey finds that discussion about plaintiffs' standing in these
cases is either thin or non-existent Id. at 381 n.85.
93. Patee, 803 F.2d at 478. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text. However,
unlike the middle approach, which allows for the possibility that a victim of indirect
discrimination allege facts that assert that he was discriminated against "because of his gender,"
courts following a strict approach find by definition that the empathetic white male was not
discriminated against because of his gender, because the discrimination is targeted against those
of a different gender. See Rodkey v. Trans World Airlines, 1997 WL 823568, at *8 (W.D. Mo.
Oct. 7, 1997) (requiring plaintiff to show that he was the victim of "gender-based
discrimination").
94. Rodkey, 1997 WL 823568, *1, *7 (W.D.Mo. Oct. 7, 1997). James Rodkey joined his
wife's suit against Trans World Airlines alleging that the presence of pictures of nude and semi-
nude females, sexually-oriented graffiti and snide remarks from coworkers about his wife
constituted a hostile environment. Id.
95. Id. at *8.
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victim of gender-based discrimination through differential
treatment.
96
The most recent decision adopting this strict approach to Title VII
standing came out of the Fourth Circuit in Childress v. City of
Richmond.97 In Childress, white-male police officers sued the City of
Richmond, Virginia for hostile environment and retaliation in
violation of Title VII.98 The officers alleged that their supervisor
made several discriminatory remarks to and about female and Black
police officers.99 After complaining to the supervisor about his
conduct through a complaint letter, the supervisor pulled the plaintiffs
away from their police duties and advised them to retract the letter. 100
He further warned that failure to do so would result in harm to their
jobs.01
The plaintiffs based their hostile environment claim on loss of
teamwork and alleged that the supervisor's comments "created a
chilling effect and a destruction of teamwork between officers of
different races and sexes."102 They also alleged that "the fulfillment
of the teamwork concept [was] a vital and necessary term and
condition of their employment contracts." 10 3
The district court denied standing to the male police officers,
finding that the officers were asserting the civil rights of others. 10 4
The court found this claim analogous to same-sex harassment claims
96. Id.
97. 120 F.3d 476(4th Cir. 1997), rev'den banc, 134 F.3d 1205(4th Cir.1998).
98. Id. at478.
99. Id. The alleged remarks included the supervisor calling his female officers his "pussy
posse" and "vaginal vigilantes" in front of both male and female officers. Childress, 907 F.
Supp. 934, 938 (E.D. Va. 1995). The plaintiffs also alleged that the supervisor referred to a
black female officer as a "mother-fucking worthless black bitch," a "no good black bitch" and a
"most useless nigger." Id. The plaintiffs also allege that the supervisor said to three female
officers, "Well, I see all my bitches are here, it must not be that time of the month." Id, at 937-
38.
100. Childress, 907 F. Supp. at 938. The officers wrote a complaint letter to the precinct
captain explaining the conduct. The letter did not mention the specific instances, but rather
questioned the supervisor's mental stability and requested that he submit to an independent
psychiatric exam. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. The officers alleged that teamwork was a "'vital and indispensable working
condition,' without which police officers and the public will be endangered." Id.
103. Childress, 907F. Supp. at938.
104. Id. at 939 (citing Inmates v. Owens, 561 F.2d 560, 561 (4th Cir. 1977)).
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and granted summary judgment to the employer because the Fourth
Circuit did not recognize same-sex harassment as a valid basis for a
Title VII claim. 0 5 The district court rejected the notion of indirect
discrimination holding that "[i]f 'protected class' is to have any
definition other than 'all of humanity,' it must mean a class which is
defined against, and protected with respect to, the alleged
discriminator."'
10 6
In affirming the district court's opinion in its entirety, the Fourth
Circuit rejected the popular notion that Title VII and Title VIII are
congruent. 0 7 In his concurring opinion, Justice Luttig noted that Title
VIII defines aggrieved person while Title VII does not.10 8 Further, he
inferred that Congress intended different meanings for the term
"aggrieved person" across the two statutes. 10 9 Justice Luttig noted
that "aggrieved person" has long been a "term of art" understood to
identify only those who satisfy both prudential and constitutional
standing limitations, which includes a general prohibition against
third-party standing."0 As a result, Justice Luttig concluded that
because Congress included no specific definition of "persons
aggrieved," the Court is compelled to read the term as it is ordinarily
understood and not as Congress defined it in another context."' Such
105. Childress, 907 F. Supp. at 939 (citing Mayo v. Kiwest Corp., 898 F. Supp. 335 (E.D.
Va 1995) (prohibiting "same-sex claims because same-sex does not amount to discrimination
'because of' the plaintiff's gender"). See supra notes 91-92.
106. Childress, 907 F. Supp. at 939.
107. Childress, 134 F.3d 1205 (4th Cir.1998). It should be noted, however, that the Fourth
Circuit originally reversed the district court's opinion, subscribing majority of the circuits
granting standing under Title VII to empathetic white males and adopting Title VIII
interpretation of "persons aggrieved." 120 F.3d 476, 481 (4th Cir. 1997). Supra notes 19-21,
75-78 and accompanying text.
108. For Title ViII's definition of "aggrieved person," see supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
109. Childress, 134 F.3d 1205, 1210 (Luttig, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 1208-09. See also supra notes 19-21 for a discussion of Justice Luttig's aversion
to the application of Title VIII to Title VII interpretation. See supra notes 33-44 and
accompanying text.
Ill. 134 F.3d at 1210. Justice Luttig states:
In notable contrast to Title VIII, Title VII does not define the term "aggrieved person."
Not only does the complete absence of a definition in Title VII imply that Congress
chose to incorporate the "term of art" definition of "aggrieved person," which as
discussed, includes prudential standing limitation; but the presence of a definition of
the term in Title VIII juxtaposed with the absence of such a definition in Tite VII
strongly evidences that Congress intended different meanings for the term "aggrieved
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a reading of "persons aggrieved" therefore compelled the court to
deny standing because the empathetic white male asserts the rights of
a third party.
112
F. Associational Rights Under Other Civil Rights Legislation
Even under traditionally narrow standing principles, those outside
the protected class would have standing, particularly if they took
specific action., 3 Section 704 of Title VII protects employees from
retaliation when they seek to enforce their Title VII rights or oppose
practices believed to be prohibited by Title VII.114
At the same time, Title VII protects employees who oppose
discriminatory practices by encouraging employees who witness
discrimination to approach their employer first without fear of
economic retaliation." 5 The promulgators of Title VII envisioned
person" across the two statutes, further reinforcing the conclusion that "aggrieved
person" in Title VII must be interpreted to incorporate prudential standing limitations.
Id.
112. Id.at1210-11.
113. See supra notes 88-112 and accompanying text.
114. Section 704(a) provides that:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against
any of his employees or applicants for employment ... to discriminate against any
member thereof or applicant for membership because he has opposed any practice
made an unlawful employment practice by this title, or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this title.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. While section 703, supra note 10 and accompanying text, covers "any
individual," Title VII's provision for retaliation only applies to "any employee or applicant for
employment" See infra note 85. See also Robinson v. Shell Oil Co, 117 S. Ct. 843, 848 (1997)
(holding that former employees are included within section 704(a)'s coverage); LEWIS, supra
note 29 at 212.
See Chandler v. Fast Lane, 868 F. Supp. 1138, 1144 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (broadly defining
section 704(a) opposition stating, "[A]n employee who exercises her authority to promote and
employ African-Americans engages in protected 'opposition' to her employer's unlawful
employment practice which seeks to deprive African-Americans of such benefits.").
The plaintiff need not demonstrate that the protested conduct actually violated Title VII,
however, plaintiffs must have a reasonable belief that the conduct was unlawful. See Berg v.
LaCrosse Cooler Co., 612 F.2d 1041 (7th Cir. 1980). Accord, Trent v. Valley Elec. Assoc. Inc.,
41 F.3d 524 (9th Cir. 1994). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3.
115. See De Medina v. Reinhardt, 444 F. Supp. 573, 580 (D.D.C. 1978) (concluding that
"tolerance of third-party reprisals would, no less than tolerance of third-party reprisals, deter
persons from exercising their protected rights under Title VII," which would be contrary to
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cooperation and voluntary compliance to be the preferred methods of
eliminating discriminatory employment practices.'" 6 Furthermore, it
is in society's best interest to afford the employer an opportunity to
resolve the dispute before an employee heads to court for remedy. 7
Consequently, Congress envisioned that the individuals in the
workplace would be the primary combatants to unlawful
discrimination, not the courts.
Under the theory of retaliation, the plaintiff does not have to
allege victimization from the actual harassment but only for the
repercussions of opposing the harassment of the female and/or
minority coworkers. 18 For example, in Berg v. LaCrosse Coller Co.,
the Seventh Circuit held that it is a violation of Title VII section
704(a) for an employer to fire an employee because he opposed
discrimination against a fellow employee." 9 After the plaintiff
establishes the initial retaliation requirements, the case proceeds
similarly to an individual disparate treatment case.
120
legislative intent); and EEOC v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating that
the purpose of the ADEA "is to prevent fear of economic retaliation from inducing employees
'quietly to accept [unlawful] conditions.') (alteration in original) (quoting Mitchell v. Robert
DeMario Jewelry, 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960)).
116. Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 726 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974)).
117. Jones, 793 F.2d at 726. "An employer has a strong interest in having an opportunity to
settle equal employment disputes through conference, conciliation and persuasion before an
aggrieved employee resorts to a lawsuit." Id.
118. See, e.g., Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396 (9th Cir. 1994). In Maynard, the
male plaintiff testified about alleged discriminatory hiring practices by defendant. Id. at 1399-
1400. However, the plaintiff in Maynard, was never subject to the discrimination to which he
testified. Id.
See also Holt v. JTM Indus., 89 F.3d 1224, 1226 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the anti-
retaliation provision of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a), which is identical to Title VII's
provision, "permits third parties to sue under [section] 623(d) if they have engaged in the
enumerated conduct, even if the conduct was on behalf of another employee's claim of
discrimination.").
119. 612 F.2d 1041 (7th Cir. 1980). See also Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d
1179, 1182 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that it is unlawful to retaliate against an individual who
opposed discrimination against a co-worker).
120. To proceed under section 704, plaintiff must produce evidence of
(1) participation in proceedings or opposition protected by section 704; (2) employer's
awareness of plaintiff's participation or opposition; (3) sustaining an adverse condition
of employment thereafter, and (4) a causal connection between the participation or
opposition and the adverse employment condition.
LEWIS, supra note 29, at 210 (1997) (citing EEOC v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d 1008,
1999)
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Indeed, courts have dismissed claims of indirect discrimination
while allowing claims for retaliation to proceed. In Lyman v. Nabil's,
Inc. a male employee brought action against his former employer
alleging hostile environment and retaliation in violation of Title
VII.12 1 The court dismissed the plaintiff's claim for discrimination.
122
However, the court granted standing to the plaintiff for retaliation
because he resisted the employer's attempts to retaliate against the
complaining women.123 The court further supported its grant of
standing because the plaintiff supported women who complained to
him about their employer's unlawful conduct. 124 The court held that
this conduct amounted to an informal complaint and granted the
plaintiff standing for retaliation in violation of Title VII.125
Congress has not left the notion of associational harm in the civil
rights context unaddressed for the conjecture of the court. Other civil
rights legislation does afford a remedy for the deprivation of
associational rights. Through the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), Congress specifically protected individuals who have a
known relationship or association with a disabled individual by
prohibiting discrimination against such individuals. 126 As previously
1012 (9th Cir. 1983)).
For a comprehensive discussion of section 704 and Title VII in general, see LEWIS, supra
note 29. See also Douglas E. Ray, Title VII Retaliation Cases: Creating a New Protected Class,
58 U. PIT. L. RFv. 405,422-24 (1997).
121. 903 F. Supp. 1443, 1445 (D. Kan. 1995). A male plaintiff, Lyman, specifically alleged
that he was present when the employer touched female employees and directed offensive
language toward them. Plaintiff further alleged that the women complained to him, which
caused emotional distress. Id.
122. Id. at 1446-49. The court, in a lengthy discussion, rejected Title VII standing in cases
where the men attempt to assert a tangible harm where they were not personally victimized.
123. 903 F. Supp. at 1448.
124. Id,
125. Id.
126. 42 U.S.C. 12100 etseq (1990). The statute provides that:
(a) No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training,
and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
(b) As used in subsection (a), the term "discrimination" includes...
(4) excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual
because of the known disability or an individual with whom the qualified individual is
known to have a relationship or association[.]
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demonstrated, Title VII jurisprudence extends additional
associational rights, to some extent, to individuals targeted because of
their personal associations with protected individuals outside of the
employment relationship.1
27
II. ANALYSIS
The analysis adopted by the majority of the circuits that affords
standing to those not directly discriminated against because of their
race, sex, or national origin is flawed.12 8 First, Title VII specifically
affords a remedy to those who are not the direct targets of
discrimination but have been deprived of associational privileges
under section 704 of Title VII.129 Consequently, the empathetic white
male is not left without remedy for his exposure to a hostile
environment. However, this remedy is available only if he
specifically opposes the discriminatory conduct and is subsequently
subjected to retaliation. 30 This remedy essentially limits the scope of
Title VII to discrimination, which continues despite warning of its
illegality. As a result, there is an imputed condition in Title VII that
non-targeted individuals must speak against the prohibited conduct.'
3
'
Providing remedy where that condition is not met restricts the
fundamental purpose of Title VII to eradicate discrimination.
132
Furthermore, providing standing to the empathetic, white male who
has turned directly to the courts for remedy, rather than exercising a
personal effort to eradicate the conduct that he witnessed, is contrary
Id § 12112(a) & (b) (emphasis added).
127. See Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Co, 791 F.2d 888 (11th Cir. 1986)
(constructing Title VII liberally to provide standing to a white man who was not hired as an
insurance salesman due to his interracial marriage); Chacon v. Ochs, 780 F. Supp. 680 (C.D.
Ca. 1991) (affording standing to caucasian woman who brought Title VII action alleging that
she was subjected to hostile work environment because she was married to a Latino man).
128. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. See also supra note 114 and accompanying text.
130. 903 F. Supp. 1443, 1448. See Lyman v. Nabil's, 903 F. Supp. 1443 (1986). See also
supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
132. This is because such a broad grant of standing disables the internal remedy of
employee opposition without the need of judicial intervention. See supra note 116 and
accompanying text.
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to Congress's intent.
133
Second, Courts should look to the ADA and reject any inferred
congressional intent to incorporate associational rights in the ADA as
grounds for standing under Title VII 34 As expresio unius, the fact
that Congress expressly included associational rights in the ADA
infers that it intended to exclude such privileges under Title VII
unless specifically provided.
Third, even if those courts granting the broadest standing have a
legitimate reason for doing so, their analysis of the empathetic, white
male's facts are flawed. 135 While it is plausible to analogize the harm
suffered by the empathetic, white male to that of the direct target, the
courts failed to make any inquiry into whether the empathetic, white
male simultaneously benefited from the harassment toward the
targeted victims.' 36 Consequently, these courts may have provided
remedy where there existed not only a speculative harm, but also a
tangible benefit arising from the unlawful activity.
37
Finally, almost all of the courts that have chosen to extend Title
VIII interpretation to Title VII's definition of "persons aggrieved"
wrote their opinions before Congress amended Title VII in 1991.
31
Knowing that such a definition as inclusion would allow for
exceptions to prudential standing limitations, Congress still failed to
incorporate their own definition of "persons aggrieved" into Title VII
or provide a reference to Title VIII for guidance on the standing
issue. 139
With the knowledge of the "persons aggrieved" term of art
definition used outside the context of Title VII, courts exceeded their
authority to extend Title VIII jurisprudence to Title VII.140 Such an
133. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
134. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). See also supra notes 80-127 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 63-80 and accompanying text.
136. See Childress v. City of Richmond, 907 F. Supp. 934, 939 (E.D. Va.). "Where, as here
a male supervisor is of the same sex as the male plaintiffs, and is actually alleged to be biased in
their favor, those male plaintiffs cannot be said to be within a protected class with respect to the
supervisor." Id.
137. Id.
138. See generally supra notes 63-67 and 75-78. The range of dates of the cases in the
classification of"Broad Approach to Standing" is 1972 to 1986.
139. Childress v. City of Richmond, 134 F.3d 1205, 1209 (4th Cir. 1998) (J. Luttig,
concurring). See also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
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expansion of Title VII may support its goals of eradication of
discrimination in the workplace, but it is Congress's role to effectuate
such an expansion, not the courts.
1 41
III. PROPOSAL
Unlawful discrimination targeted at women and Black persons
infects the workplace harming many beyond those whom the violator
has targeted.142 Particularly in the case of hostile environment
actions, all persons present in such an environment suffer harm.
Furthermore, even those who traditionally would be viewed as
beneficiaries of discrimination, such as white males, are increasingly
enlightened about the ramification of discrimination and feel
personally harmed.
However, the notion that the empathetic, white male appreciates
the harm suffered by targets of harassment should not be a rationale
for broadening standing. This is particularly true when Congress has
imputed a condition precedent that the empathetic, white male oppose
such activity before he may turn to the courts for relief.
The most obvious remedy to this conflict among the courts would
be a return to strict interpretation of Title VII.143 This proposal would
include adopting an exclusive use of the term of art definition of
"persons aggrieved," and a requirement that the empathetic, white
male allege facts sufficient to show that he suffered from harassment
"because of his sex."'
144
If Congress should desire to provide such standing, it could
proceed along two avenues: 1) Congress could amend Title VII to
include a right to assert claims for those present in the hostile
environment, or those who are indirect victims of discrimination; or
2) Congress could provide a separate system of remedies in which
perpetrators are forced to pay a separate fine for the harm that they
have inflicted generally on society. This proposal would be consistent
141. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., Childress v. City of Richmond, 120 F.3d 476 (4th Cir. 1997); Patee v.
Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 803 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1986).
143. See supra notes 88-112 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Rodkey v. Trans World
Airlines, 1997 WL 823568, *8 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 7, 1997).
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with fines for violation of environmental standards or the like.
However, even if Congress grants such standing, the courts should
require additionally that empathetic, white males rebut an inference
that they benefited tangibly from the harassment directed at others.
This procedure would help to prevent a windfall of unjust remedies
being granted to opportunistic and passive witnesses to illegal
conduct. Such an approach would provide a safeguard until the courts
can refine their inquiries or until Congress provides more guidance in
this vague area of Title VII.
CONCLUSION
Although Title VII created a unique mechanism to provide
remedy to those outside the victimized class, the courts consistently
undermine the retaliation provision by failing to require non-targeted
individuals to oppose the illegal activity before the courts will
intervene. The loosening of standing requirements under Title VII has
incapacitated the pre-judicial remedies Congress anticipated to be the
primary force to eradicate discrimination in the workplace. Unless
Congress specifically implements a definition of "persons aggrieved"
to include the empathetic white male, the courts are not doing society
any favors by eliminating the personal responsibility of those in the
workplace to oppose that which is unlawful.
Laura M Jordan*
* J.D. 1999, Washington University.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol55/iss1/7
